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Abstract 
In this article reflexivity is defined as a neoliberal mode of thought, often evident in our 
research data as a circular pattern which fails to comprehend contemporary modernity. This 
type of reflexivity is illustrated with reference to austerity and food poverty. The article 
argues that while it might be relatively easy to observe this kind of reflexivity in others, it is 
much more difficult to gauge its effects on the researcher’s own epistemological perspective. 
When attempting to do so, the premises upon which we construct academic knowledge and 
the importance of certain data that might, at first sight, appear to be ‘useless’ come under 
scrutiny. Lacanian psychoanalysis and the works of Jean Baudrillard are used in order to 
explore alternatives.   
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AUSTERITY AND REFLEXIVITY 
Austerity envelops us, whether we are rich or poor. It is the by-product of neoliberal 
economics, the undesired side-effect of the pursuit of wealth and prosperity; possibly a 
condition for life, if one takes into consideration how quickly people get used to the idea that 
there will not always be jobs for everyone, and Lazzarato’s (2011) powerful argument in The 
Making of the Indebted Man, that we should be getting used to always being in debt, 
enmeshed in a web of unserviceable financial obligations which now inflect human 
subjectivity.  
Researching austerity inevitably brings one face to face with the reality of social 
justice, the community, the everyday discourses of living in poverty or helping others to 
survive, as well as the importance of thinking politically, radically, psychoanalytically. It also 
brings one face to face with reflexivity, not just the researcher’s awareness of their privileged 
position in the interview situation (Holloway and Jefferson, 2000) or the academic’s 
awareness of the limitations of their chosen epistemological perspective when writing, but 
moments that catch one unaware and offer insights into one’s relationship to the ‘work’, the 
‘other’, the ‘object’ and the ‘subject’. These moments, delightful or anxiety-provoking as 
they might be, are also potentially radical, inviting us to think – reflexively in fact – how the 
world thinks us, rather than how we think the world. To such moments we may wish to 
respond with unorthodox combinations of analysis (Blackman et al., 2008, 10), ways of 
finding common ground between theoretical perspectives that, at first sight, seem to 
antagonise one another. The need to think radically, differently, daringly, is not a superfluous 
academic pursuit but an urgent task that reinforces existing critiques of neoliberal austerity.  
Below I make such an attempt, bringing together Lacanian psychoanalysis and Jean 
Baudrillard, a vociferous critic of Freud who sometimes nods approvingly in Lacan’s 
direction and argues that the death drive has exceptional critical potential, if rescued from the 
clutches of pedestrian psychoanalysis (2004, 150). Lacan provides a range of concepts 
suitable for discussing contemporary socio-political formations, such as the fours discourses, 
key discursive positions from which subjects articulate or receive messages1 (Lacan, 2007), 
and the notion of the Other, the socio-cultural frame of reference for all our enunciations and 
actions. Lacanian scholars of ideology and politics also draw on the notion of the phantasy, 
the imaginary and often erroneous adherence of subjects to a particular set of ideas, and, of 
course, the notion of the death drive, both as perilous repetition of ideological impasses 
(Dean, 2013) and as pivotal element in their dismantling and interpretation (Žižek, 1997).  
Baudrillard is keen on such impasses, thinking that they illustrate the fundamental 
problem with capitalism, namely, that it is a system structured solely around exchange and 
value. Exchange and value form the system’s unique mode of operation; everything has 
value; everything must have value in order to have meaning. Moments when value and 
exchange falter, argues Baudrillard, expose the fundamental weakness of capitalism and 
create scope for thinking differently. He therefore proposes the notion of the impossible 
exchange (discussed below) as a key concept in the critique of ideology (Smith, 2010). By 
the same token, he draws attention to anything that does not have exchange value; the 
useless, the remainder and the defunct (Baudrillard, 2001), in order to illuminate the 
restrictive logic of capitalism and the possibility of thinking radically.  
It is rather impossible to do justice to Lacan’s or Baudrillard’s thought in the space of 
a short paper, or to discuss thoroughly their convergences and irreconcilable differences. 
Suffice it to say, that they are both committed to a pursuit of truth which leaves little room for 
narcissistic certainties and, most pertinent to the present case, little room for illusory 
assumptions about the superiority of one’s perspective. In terms of reflexivity, therefore, 
what one must encounter in the process of researching-learning-knowing, is not how to make 
the most of the amassed wealth of knowledge, even when doing so in a critical fashion, but 
how to accommodate, and in fact learn, from one’s ignorance. In that sense, both Lacan and 
Baudrillard value the disturbing insight acquired at the limits of knowledge and that, for both 
theorists, can be linked to the death drive and its radical potential.   
                                                            
1 With the four discourses Lacan (2007) draws attention to the transindividual nature of 
language. There are four discourses. The discourse of the Master, which posits itself as a 
‘self-evident’ position of authority and knowledge; the discourse of the hysteric, which 
questions but also adheres to the Master; the discourse of the university, which produces a 
supposedly ‘neutral’ form of knowledge and the discourse of the analysts, inverts and 
subverts the previous positions. For an account of the role of the four discourses in politics 
and culture see Clemens and Grigg (2006).  
Below, I discuss the role of reflexivity and value/uselessness drawing on research on 
the effects of austerity in East London2. As part of my research, I interviewed several food 
bank managers asking questions about the sustainability of food banks, as well as their views 
on poverty, charity, the role of the community, and the profile of their clients. The first part 
of the paper offers a psychoanalytic reading of austerity as represented in the words of food 
bank managers and looks into the role of reflexivity in their own statements. The second part 
of the paper discusses my own reflexive engagement with the interpretation of the data and 
how a negative comment by a colleague led me to re-think the way we approach both 
reflexivity and austerity. Inevitably, and contrary to academic convention, some passages are 
written in first person.  
AUSTETITY IN FOOD BANK MANAGERS’ ACCOUNTS  
Food banks are growing in number due to the effects of austerity on the low paid and those 
relying on benefits (Downing and Kennedy, 2014). The food banks I researched were located 
in East London, one of the most deprived areas of the capital. They were run by local 
churches, supported by the Trussel Trust (2013), a nation-wide charity which helps local 
initiatives on a franchise basis.  Food banks rely on volunteers to run two or three times a 
week, distributing non-perishable foods which are donated by the local community. 
Managers are often priests or members of the local church.  
Despite the fact that public opinion seems to have accepted food banks as part of 
the British welfare landscape (Rayner, 2013; Harrison, 2013; Butler, 2013), the 
Department of Work and Pensions dismisses them as not part of the welfare system. A 
government source has been quoted as saying: ‘The Trussell Trust itself says they are 
opening three new foodbanks every week, so it’s not surprising more people are using 
them’ (Downing and Kennedy, 2014, 9). In 2013 Lord Freud of the Department of Work 
and Pensions made the suggestion that food bank users were chancers taking advantage of 
free good, and insisted that the recent sharp increase in people resorting to food banks was 
‘not necessarily linked to benefits sanctions or delays’ (Morris, 2013). This puts food 
banks in a peculiar position in relation to the State. Their clients are coming through the 
system, referred to them by doctors, schools, job centres and social workers, but food 
banks receive neither recognition nor financial support by the authorities. Given the 
situation, food bank managers were eager to stress the importance of helping the deserving 
                                                            
2 For a preliminary report in this research see Tsilimpounidi, M, Sampson, A. and Voela, A, 2014.  
poor, echoing the criticism that they feed scroungers, but were understandably unwilling to 
discuss why some poor are more deserving than others.   
It is fair to say that organisations with limited means must allocate their resources 
wisely. Food bank managers acknowledged the existence of practical limitations but also 
spoke about ‘discouraging dependency’. Food banks usually give three vouchers, roughly 
the equivalent of food for three weeks:  
If you give any more [than three vouchers] it is dependency-creating;  what we’re trying to 
do is to get people to look after themselves and take a grip of their situation, and do 
something about it.  
Discouraging dependency usually means returning clients to the welfare services, and 
speaks volumes about the real problem: the long term consequences of austerity-poverty 
and the medicalisation of poverty by approximation to dependency.   
Charity operates in a network of social values. Despite the suspicion towards potential 
frauds, clients are normally seen as marginalised individuals to whom society has turned 
their back. The food bank is therefore considered as a holding environment in which 
vulnerable people might find support to gradually overcome their difficulties. A quasi-
therapeutic discourse is often adopted. One is encouraged to talk:    
OK we’re a charity but let’s put that aside. I can help you as much as you open up – you tell me 
this much, I can only help you this much. You tell me a little bit more, I can tell you what to 
do, so you’ve got to trust me, you’ve got to talk to me. 
Neoliberalism, the ideological arm of the free-market economy in which austerity occurs, 
sees the individual as a free and competent agent, a manager of oneself who must take life in 
their own hands. The individual is also supposed to be entrepreneurial, aspiring, achieving, 
and ultimately able to support itself. Failure to do so is often seen as lack of willpower or 
moral fibre (Brown, 2006). Food bank managers offered a mixture of opinions on the matter. 
Benefits are one’s entitlement, and clients were encouraged to claim what was rightfully 
theirs. At the same time, an affirmative approach to life was encouraged. One should not 
suffer in silence or despair. A priest-food bank manager said about a client who was suicidal:   
I started talking to him, tried to encourage him that there is life, a better life out here, that 
people are making it, people are finding their way around.  
Love is important. It is said to be essential for the community, not the big society but 
the community of the vulnerable and the volunteers who meet at the food bank. Love and 
charity are seen as the starting point for returning to a state of happiness. The nostalgia for the 
better days is palpable in the following statement:  
And then everybody will be moving into being happy once again, as we used to be, so we are 
praying and hoping that the seed will not die in the ground. That’s it.  
It is not surprising that food bank managers intentionally or unintentionally echo key 
neoliberal discourses which either see individuals as responsible for taking life into their own 
hands or pathologise welfare dependents (Standing, 2011), stressing the need for counselling, 
therapy or even resilience training. It is not surprising that the concept of receiving and 
redeeming vouchers is monetary in its conception: vouchers are food bank currency, nominal 
bank notes to be ‘exchanged’ for food in a system of transactions which encompasses relations 
between professional bodies and charitable organisations, as well as relations of accountability 
and trust. Food banks are caught in the current discourses of budget cuts, efficiency and 
stamping out fraud. Inevitably they are emplaced in a climate of negative trust and reduced 
good will. At the same time, they are a relatively new phenomenon in the symbolic economy 
of charitable Christianity which had traditionally relied more on religious and moral criteria 
and less on policy-led directives for choosing its beneficiaries. Thus, the fact that food banks 
are designed to plug a short term gap in collaboration with state agencies makes them servants 
of two masters, God and the State, attempting to strike an almost impossible balance between 
helping the hungry and the poor – a fundamental Christian premise – and conforming to the 
restrictive bureaucratic criteria by which the welfare system identifies eligible clients.  
Inevitably, food bank managers were reluctant to be drawn into an openly political 
discussion. They were careful and circumspect: ‘you know, the government’s doing their 
best’; or mildly critical and realistic in accepting food banks as a fact of life:  
The government is for the people, and here the government is not for the people. So the 
government need to also know what’s going on with the people. We also expect them to 
tackle it [poverty]… Unfortunately food banks will always be there because we’ll always 
have the poor, we’ll always have people that will need the food, but we don’t want quite a lot 
of people depending on food.  
Yet, when speaking about their service compared to the state agencies, managers claimed to 
offer more than the State and ‘more than food’. This added value of their service is justified 
as follows:  
So we try to be human, we try to be flexible, so sometimes what I will do, I will send them 
[clients] back to the social services or the Job Centre and say, ‘OK you know I can’t 
support him (client) for this long. You are going to do something to get this thing sorted 
out’.  
Flexibility chimes with humanity. Yet humanity apparently has its limits, especially 
when one is eager to comply with bureaucratic regulations. An astounding example is the 
following:  
Participant: The people that are coming here are coming through frontline care professionals,          
so we don’t get people off the streets. 
Interviewer: But if someone walks in and says, ‘I’m hungry,’ would you feed them?  
Participant: No we won’t. We will direct them to an agency that can help them, we can never 
tell who’s coming in, anybody could come in, they could be completely justified, but how 
would we know that? 
Neoliberalism, argues Gilbert, should not be thought as a wholly uniform and concrete 
doctrine but as ‘enabling certain behaviours and not others’ (Gilbert, 2013, 7). When it comes 
to austerity, I would argue, it enables contradiction and absurdity, like being charitable and 
feeding the hungry but not until their status has been established – as if hunger can wait. It 
also enables ambivalence, separating the deserving poor from the cheats, and loving 
(exonerating) and hating (holding responsible) the State in equal measure. By the same token, 
the emotional labour of the volunteers, which is in fact considerable, and the daily contact 
with food poverty give rise to projection: it could be me in their place. This fear is alleviated 
by the very pragmatic stance taken my some managers (e.g. we will not feed just anyone), 
while thinking oneself, reflexively, in the place of the other. As one food bank manager put it 
about having to eat whatever is on offer:   
When your back’s up against the wall, you’ve got no choice, so you make it work. 
Austerity jars with the myth of the caring State and the myth of prosperity for all, two 
discourses that even those who demonstrate their fictive character find hard to relinquish. 
From a Lacanian perspective, food bank managers speak from the position of the hysteric, 
who articulates a reaction to the discourse of the Master (State) but does not question his 
sovereignty. The hysteric’s discourse, argues Zupančič, often appears as a discourse about 
injustice and pleads for the rights of those at the margins. Simultaneously, it conveys a 
structural complaint about the master’s inadequacy (castration): ‘the hysteric is much more 
revolted by the weakness of power than by power itself, and the truth of her or his basic 
complaint is that the master is not master enough’ (Zupančič, 2006, 165).  
The discourse of the hysteric applies to the subject’s (food bank managers’ in the 
present case) position towards the Other and her expectations from the Other (Master, State). 
Two possibilities usually arise: the Other (State) needs something which the subject can 
provide – in this case, food as a stop gap solution until the State can, once again, assume full 
responsibility and we can all return to prosperity; or the Other (State) is depriving the subject 
of something that she needs or desires (Žižek 1997, 33). One may immediately assume that 
this something must be the unrestricted access to welfare and benefits. But this, in fact, does 
not concern the managers directly. Only their clients. What the Other/State withholds from 
the managers is the recognition of their labour, the symbolic value of what they provide which 
is not inscribed in the productive system but is treated as surplus. This complaint is not 
explicitly voiced as disappointment at the fact that the Other/State enjoys at their expense 
(Zupančič 2006, 165). However, they register it in their harshness towards the ‘cheats’ or 
when speaking about offering ‘more than’ the State agencies to their clients: more than food, 
more time to empathise and listen; spiritual solace, love and community. It is this double 
excess (being both ‘surplus’ and ‘more than’ the other), I argue, that sums up their perceived 
value in a system of socio-political equations.  
The reluctance to engage directly in political conversation can also be interpreted from 
a psychoanalytic perspective. Discussing neoliberalism from a Lacanian perspective, Dean 
(2013) argues that two of its key characteristics, reflexivity and complexity, should be 
understood with reference of the drive. Neoliberal reflexivity is akin to the drive which ‘takes 
the form of a circuit that is never closed’ (Dean, 2013, 140). In politics, she argues, reflexivity 
‘substitutes action with circular thinking’ and with ‘narcissistic circuits of self-absorption’ 
(Dean, 2013, 151). In academia it motivates ‘levels of increasing meta-ness, commenting on 
discourses, practices and alternatives, until the need to act loses its force and urgency’ (ibid).  
Dean draws on the Freudian drive which captures a specific reversal between ‘me’ and 
the ‘other’. The drive encourages a transposition between the subject and the object: the object 
to be seen, studied, or observed, is replaced by the subject who sees, studies or observes. A 
misleading reflexivity is established when, seeing the other as object, makes me the subject 
(Dean, 2013, 139). Applying the logic of the drive on modern capitalism, Dean explains how 
the tactics of the ‘management’ of everything, from risk, to assets, to poverty, creates the 
impression of being in control. It turns the process of endless, drive-like management into a 
supposedly effective way of doing things ad infinitum: always managing but not to clear end 
(Dean, 2013, 145).  
Complexity, the other characteristic of neoliberal thought, displaces accountability 
with reference to knowledge (Dean, 2013, 149). In practical terms, it corresponds to the widely 
held belief that the global financial system is too complex for anyone to grasp in its entirety, 
or to discuss in terms of blame or responsibility. The fact that it is hard to know everything or 
have access to all possible factors before making a decisions is often quoted as sufficient 
explanation or excuse of failure, lack of clarity or good judgement. Partial knowledge, 
therefore, is not accepted by people as a limitation but as a condition (Dean, 2013, 150).  
Dean also draws attention to a sense of satisfaction involved in an endless pursuit, a 
satisfaction very pertinent to the managers’ disappointment and feeling unappreciated. In 
Freudian analysis the purpose of the drive is enjoyment, but enjoyment is not necessarily 
related to reaching a specific goal or finishing a specific task. Failure might procure 
enjoyment, so long as a certain circular trajectory is being traversed. Regarding neoliberal 
logic, there is only a modicum of enjoyment, a pay-off enough for the subject to keep going 
(Dean, 2013, 140). We could consider the management of poverty as an endless activity where 
a modicum of enjoyment supports the charitable commitment to plodding on, being a 
volunteer, rather than a recipient of help: while I am here (manager), I am not there (client); I 
cannot see the big picture (too complex) but I still attain the little bit of ‘reward’ for having 
accomplished something that will be lost in an ocean of needs and a client’s return to the care 
of the state.  
THE RESEARCHER’S REFLEXIVITY AND THE USE OF THE USELESS 
The above reading identifies patterns of discourse consonant with both neoliberal ideology 
and the drive-like character of late capitalism. It highlights the ambivalence neoliberal 
austerity produces in speaking subjects, in their attitudes towards both fellow human beings 
and the state. It also highlights the misleading role reflexivity, infinity and complexity might 
play in that setting. Drawing on a psychoanalytic theoretical model, this interpretation 
approaches the managers’ discourse as a symptom of neoliberal ideology. However, the 
efficiency of my interpretation began to lose its appeal when I realised that I was probably 
doing something quite similar: by abstracting and theorising my data I was perhaps 
transposing the limitations of my knowledge onto the ‘infinity’ of knowledge, interpreting-
displacing my findings onto a higher level and producing myself as (interpreting) subject vis 
a vis the object of my inquiry. Should I be disappointed at this error, or pleased with the 
belated reflexive insight? Perhaps I should also be reminding myself that the results of my 
research would be useful to someone, addressing them, as we always do, to ‘whom it may 
concern’ upon publication. But does this posited, hypothetical other differ all that much from 
the Master/Other in my interviewees’ discourses? The sudden realisation made me feel both 
anxious and annoyed.  
Below I explore this grey area of anxiety and reflexivity, first by developing the 
epistemological perspective from which such an inquiry can be attempted, and subsequently 
proposing ways of approaching the object of research differently. For this purpose I bring 
together Baudrillard and Lacan, though not quite in the way proposed in the emerging 
literature.   
Baudrillard finds both Marxism and Freudianism inadequate for understanding 
contemporary modernity. Their limitation, he argues, arises from their understanding of value 
as positive (Baudrillard, 2004, 219; Smith, 2010, 175). For Baudrillard, Marxism is a political 
economy of the lost object (2004, 16), striving to reverse capitalism by reclaiming what is 
alienated by the capitalist as surplus value (2004, 36). Marxism is therefore unable to 
challenge capitalism radically, because it adheres to the same notions of alienation of the 
product of labour by the master, accumulation and surplus.  
Baudrillard extends a similar critique to Freudian psychoanalysis, via language and 
signification. The signifier is given a positive value (2004, 227) and Freud’s analysis is 
functional and economic (2004, 223), focusing on the unknown-repressed quantity that needs 
to be recovered. Thus, both the libidinal and the political economy operate on a principle of 
repression/alienation, accepting the existence of a remainder that can be accessed, liberated 
and productively reclaimed (2004, 229). The unconscious can be thought as such a remainder 
(2004, 230). Further similarities can be observed: in Marxist economy the surplus resembles 
the ‘something’ that the Master/Other enjoys or withholds in the example we discussed 
above, known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as object a (Proto, 2013b).  
The critique of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism is part of Baudrillard’s theory 
of simulation (2004), a historical-epistemological critique which focuses on the gap between 
representation and the object of representation. Baudrillard argues that successive ages of 
bourgeois capitalist production have eroded the distance between representation and its 
object, and, more importantly, have rendered the referent (the object in the real world) 
obsolete and irrelevant. Baudrillard’s primary example is the copy (Proto, 2013a), initially a 
reproduction of an original which eventually replaces and eclipses the original in the next 
cycle of reproduction. Likewise in economy, especially in contemporary times, the gradual 
easing of restrictions in global trading, the removal of the golden standard (Baldwin, 2015) 
and the virtualisation of financial exchanges have produced a free-floating capitalism in 
which wealth and numerical values do not necessarily correspond to ‘real’ money. Simulation 
excises the object as real world referent. Simulation also infinitises desire. Making more 
money from money, for instance, becomes a purpose in itself (Proto, 2013b), a fetishist 
pursuit which makes the satisfaction of the desire to make money, like the pursuit of the 
Lacanian object a, even more remote.  
Baudrillard’s theory offers an insight into how bourgeois metaphysics, the principles 
of which are aim, unity and truth, has created an ideal transcendental subject by aligning 
subjectivity to the production of knowledge in terms of utility and rationality, and by 
establishing the principles of equivalence and identity as the predominant modes of thought 
(Proto, 2013a). In this context, subjectivity is seen as the repository of rational knowledge 
(truth), as well as the founding principle of the transparency of history and reason; identity 
(A=A) operates not only as a philosophical principle but as an ideological substratum, and 
‘history synthesizes opposites into a higher unity’ (Woodward as cited in Proto 2013a). 
Through these operations, the privileged position of the subject is created by homologically 
projecting and then identifying the subject’s view point as the vantage point of view and then 
accepting the result as ‘rational mind’ (Proto 2013a).  
From Baudrillard’s perspective, my inability to see things clearly at the beginning as 
well as the reflexive reversal of this condition serve the same purpose: producing more and 
making the produced knowledge available for reintegration in a discourse which can 
accommodate not only evidence of value alienated in the Other, or the subject’s phantasy 
(mine as well as the food bank managers’) of giving something to the Other, but also, and 
most important, their remainder, in the present case the belated awareness and by-product of 
the process.  
At this point Baudrillard’s thought seems to converge with the Lacanian critique of 
the discourse of the university, the supposedly neutral knowledge which is essentially a new 
and reformed discourse of the master (Zupančič, 2006, 168). The two are separated by a shift 
from the master’s absolute discourse to an endless movement, where the otherness linked to 
surplus (the alienated enjoyment in psychoanalytic terms) is smoothly and constantly 
reintegrated into the mass capital:  
Once a higher level has been passed, surplus jouissance is no longer surplus 
jouissance but is inscribed simply as value to be inscribed in or deducted from the totality of 
whatever it is that is accumulated – what is accumulating from out of an essentially 
transformed nature’ (Lacan, cited in Zupančič, 2006, 170-1).  
In the above framework, capitalist production as master discourse is seen as constant 
production of otherness and constant valorization of this otherness, that is, transformation 
into value (Zupančič, 2006, 174).  
What was I doing then? Was I just witnessing or chancing upon the inescapable 
propensity of the dominant system to transform everything into value? Worse, was I just 
reproducing that propensity? The reassurance that both feelings of frustration and 
possibilities reside at that point (Zupančič, 2006) were not very consoling. Could things be 
done differently?  
In his early Symbolic Exchange and Death (2004) Baudrillard speaks of a process of 
signification and exchange, which, unlike exchange in the Marxist and psychoanalytic 
tradition, does not leaves a remainder or surplus. Baudrillard thinks that such a process is best 
exemplified in language by certain forms of poetry (2004, 226) and in culture by the 
exchange of a gift as practised in societies of the past (Smith, 2013, 86). In both cases the 
gesture or process of signification is consumed and exhausted within the limits of a specific 
task and nothing remains to be transferred to a higher level.  
Baudrillard returns to the notion of the remainder in Simulation and Simulacra (2006, 
143-4), speaking, like the Lacanians, of capitalism’s ability to integrate any surplus. Resigned 
to such a propensity, Baudrillard proposes that we should do nothing to prevent the process, 
letting dominant ideology take its course, and waiting until it implodes, when nothing else, no 
surplus or difference, is left to be assimilated.  
Elsewhere, Baudrillard develops the impossible exchange as an impasse that 
illuminates the very nature of consumerism-capitalism. The impossible exchange is both a 
remainder that resists assimilation and an act revealing that the referent (real object) has been 
excised in the process of simulation. In the Symbolic Exchange and Death (2004) the 
impossible exchange brings the system to a halt by not producing anything to be liberated or 
made available for the next level. It is therefore a function of the death drive, the latter being 
a radical force that resist accumulation, exhausting itself here and now, in the process of 
signification (Baudrillard, 2004, p. 228). Baudrillard also argues that truth is not recovered 
from the unconscious but inhabits a social exchange. He returns to the notion of the 
impossible exchange and the useless remainder in one of his last books, Impossible Exchange 
(2001), this time naming – and almost mourning – the loss of the referent that advanced 
capitalism and the technology have gradually excised and made useless: art, work, religion, 
the body, in short humanity itself (2001, 43). He then talks about ‘the useless truth’ (2001, 
44), an extension of what has been lost or excised, a term that is meant to stir concern in its 
philosophical absurdity.  
In my data I discovered a good example of a useless truth and a ‘pointless’ gesture that 
illustrates how the remainder might work. One of my interviewees told me that the previous 
Christmas he invited the food bank clients to a party at the local community centre. Unsure 
whether invitations send by post would reach them, since most of them were in temporary 
accommodation or occasionally homeless, he and his volunteers delivered them in person:  
On the 17th of December last year we organised a party here, a Christmas party for all the clients, 
and these are people who cannot remember when last anybody invited them. How would we 
invite a ‘homeless’ person to come for a party? We personally wrote their name and delivered 
the post to their accommodation… I budgeted for 80 but this hall was filled with 138 people – 
some came in wheelchairs and they were so excited, they said that this is for the first time they 
receive [an invitation]. That’s very nice.  
This, in my view, is a beautiful and senseless act that evades the circuit of 
‘dependency’. It resists the bio-political discourse of supporting and feeding the poor or 
giving them incentives to get out of their poverty (e.g. this is what we do for you; what are 
you going to do for yourself?); it defies indebtedness, bio-political management and 
manipulation. It is a ‘useless’ and quintessentially communal act, full of dignity but no 
exchange value. The truth and power of the act lies in what is exchanged there and then, a gift 
in the circuit of commercial exchange, a use-less (non-productive) pleasure exhausted 
between givers and takers.  
I included the above incident in a conference presentation on austerity, politics and 
policy. A colleague reacted negatively. There was no point, he remarked rather tersely, in 
including such anecdotes in discussions of policy and politics. Such stuff was irrelevant. I 
could see his point: there was nothing of use to be extracted from this example. But what was 
he objecting to? Was an act of humanity irrelevant to food hunger and austerity? In neoliberal 
discourse humanity no longer figures as the absolute principle beyond value, or, in Lacanese, 
as a master signifier that attracts and organises other signifiers into meaning3. It is relativized 
by being emplaced in a managerial system (think of the term management of human 
resources), demanding that humans that are out of the productive economy need to return to 
the system (see also Standing, 2014), ceasing to be superfluous to a system of rational 
choices and productivity. Humanity excised as a cardinal referent.  
I would argue that we should start noticing such use-less remainders in our data. Not 
with a view to re-integrating them in ‘the system’, but as that which genuinely disturbs; not 
simply as uncomfortable truth (we are used to those) but as the reflexive horrible mirror of 
(in)humanity in neoliberal austerity. Unanswerable questions – impossible exchanges of 
meaning – may arise at this point: can humanity be ‘reassimilated’ in the system of capitalist 
austerity values? How was it reduced to a remainder-excess in the first place? At what point 
did ‘humanity’ receded as a master signifier and became a remainder?  
The researcher’s reflexivity as impossible and potentially useless-disturbing 
knowledge comes to mind. What is my impossible exchange, my reflexivity? What is to be 
done at this point? Baudrillard does not advocate a return to difference or a restitution of the 
Other. Instead of that, he invites us to think radically differently, along the lines of a 
challenging reversal: ‘it is the object that thinks us; it is the effect which causes us; it is 
language which speaks us; it is death which lies in wait for us’ (2001, 89). This radical way 
of thinking is pursued by prioritising the object over the subject (Baudrillard 2001, 88-9).  
                                                            
3 The master signifier is empty. It is an abstract idea like ‘Justice for All’ (Glynos 2001) around which 
a political (or ideological) field is usually organised. Laclau emphasizes the contingency of any term 
that purports to convey the true and permanent meaning of a master signifier. New terms fill its place 
at different times, attracting and renewing allegiance to its cause and reorganizing the field of 
ideology around it but can never quite capture or pin down its entire meaning.  
 
For Baudrillard the critical problem of contemporary modernity is both social and 
individual. As social order becomes more virtual and less dependent upon external referents, 
more self-contained and perfectly self-reflexive, we begin to find it increasingly difficult to 
judge the truth of appearances. Many traditional disciplines, like Law, Economics or 
Humanism face up to the impossibility of external reference or grounding. Likewise, 
individuals are faced with impossible exchanges when encountering the demise of higher 
values, the old referents for their acts and decisions. Unable to ground their existence in 
anything else, continues Baudrillard, they ‘turn in on themselves, demanding the right to be 
themselves, which is ‘the end of the self, the point at which the subject is lost’ (Heggarty, 
2004, 86). It is this narcissistic, self-reflexive turn that Baudrillard seeks to challenge via a 
process of knowing based on the ‘impossible exchange’. The latter proves the absurdity of 
the metaphorical sliding of meaning. It constitutes a process of self-knowledge: ‘We do not 
know ourselves distinctly and clearly until the day we see ourselves from the outside as 
another’ (Baudrillard in Levin 1996, 32). This, of course, does not call for a naïve 
identification or exchange of places with the other. It rather concerns the necessity of 
contemplating or abruptly encountering our vantage point of seeing from the place of the 
other, or under similar limit conditions. Thus, stepping outside oneself constitutes a critical 
activity which not only brings ideology and the Other under scrutiny but challenges the ‘I’ as 
the centre of truth and certainty (Heggarty 2004, 45).  
Along those lines Baudrillard proposes that the world thinks us. This reflexive 
relation goes much further than Lacan’s (1991) anecdote about the tin can (material object) 
starting back at him (the thinking subject). It goes even further than the logic of the object a 
as remainder, or locus of lack or fleeting presence on all registers of being (Imaginary, 
Symbolic and Real). The convergence between Lacan and Baudrilard has primarily been 
studied with reference to simulation, as an exchange of places between the subject and object, 
a kind of imaginary fusion which threatens to abolish meaningful separation and difference 
(Proto, 2013a and b). I would add that their convergence must also be thought along the lines 
of a more radical interpretation of drive. Drawing on Freud who understands the drive as a 
succession of voices – the active voice (to see), the passive voice (to be seen) and the middle 
voice (to give oneself to be seen – Lacan argues that the operation of the drive is reflexive in 
the sense that it allows “a new subject” to appear when the tri-partite move is accomplished 
(Lacan, 1991, 179). For Lacan the drive is always the death drive (Evans, 1996, 33). When 
the death drive enters the symbolic order it inhabits different zones of the body becoming 
partial drive(s). A different aspect of the death drive emerges at the end of the analytic 
process, beyond the realm of language and desire. Žižek draws attention to the knowledge 
produced at that point, emphasizing the difference between the knowledge of the drive and 
the knowledge of one’s desire: while the latter is located in language and is eventually 
articulated as the subject’s truth, the former is described as ‘non-subjectivised’ and 
‘acephalus’ knowledge (Žižek 1997, 36-37). When this ‘acephalus’ knowledge emerges one 
encounters anxiety but also goes beyond the Other, without whom one is left with a ‘being’ 
which is ‘infinity as such’ (Verhaeghe, 2001, 103). It is in this disruptive ‘beyond’, I would 
argue, that Lacan and Baudrillard converge, in their challenge to subjectivity and ideology. In 
that realm Lacan finds the knowledge of the death drive and Baudrillard the impasse of the 
impossible exchange, both of which jar with the omnivorous, in-different Other (see also 
Voela, 2012).  
Encountering the limitations of thought and seeing one’s theoretical perspective via 
the lens of another theory is, indeed, a destructive-constructive experience. This kind of 
reflexive knowledge is un-productive: it annoys, irritates but cannot be denied, or exchanged, 
or integrated in a dialectic process. Reflexivity from that perspective is not just awareness of 
the limitations of knowledge or extra knowledge but a permanent challenge – to borrow an 
expression form philosophy, a view from nowhere (Nagel, 1986). Seeing myself from that 
perspective I appear not as sovereign rational subject but as a vanishing mediator of the 
several realities I hold together in my inquiry: me, subject and object of austerity and 
neoliberalism, conduit between data and representation, effect of the neoliberal master 
discourse and university knowledge, place-holder in an impossible structure. Nobus and 
Quinn (2005) draws attention to the radical ‘stupidity’ that lies at the heart of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the knowledge that is not to simply acquired or produced for useful purposes 
(2005, 2), but the traumatic (2005, 3) and disruptive of knowledge (2005, 5) which is neither 
accumulative nor sacrificial, but a fall of knowledge (2005, 136) which echoes with the 
Baudrillarian perspective.  
REFLECTING (ON) THE USELESS 
Austerity envelops us, whether we are rich or poor. It causes our discourses to rotate between 
mastery, academic knowledge and a difficult remainder, notions of usefulness and 
uselessness, value and lack of value, inclusion, exclusion and re-integration.  
In Lacanian psychoanalysis having seen-known reflexively and from the point of 
view of the drive always involves a significant break-though, or a traversal of the phantasy 
that normally supports our relationship with the big Other. For some Lacanians the aim of 
critique – of a reflexive critique in the present case – ‘is not how to eliminate terms such as 
illusion and misrecognition, but how to draw their boundaries through an articulation of a 
new ontology – an ontology which involves positing the socio-symbolic order as lacking’ 
(Glynos, 2001, 196).  
Baudrillard, for whom the social Other has already collapsed into in-different 
simulation, seems to think that it might be too late for that. If humanity has been excised from 
the circuit of capitalist production, all that is left is reflexive melancholia, saudad for what 
has disappeared (2001, 40-41). Such a melancholia seems to characterise the political left at 
the moment, claims Brown (2003), in the wake of the collapse of communal values. It has yet 
to advance to a different – more productive? – form of engagement.  
In the meantime, and taking both Baudrillard and the Lacanian exhortation to remain 
stupid into account, we might proceed by doing things differently, by not trying to provide an 
answer: becoming the reflexive mirror of useless acts of kindness, and witnessing or offering 
a testimony in the ethical sense of the terms, bringing to attention gift and useless exchanges 
and remaining sceptical about the exchange value of our knowledge.  
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